Inequality in Education: Evidence for Latin America by Cruces, Guillermo Antonio et al.
 Copyright    UNU-WIDER 2011 
1 
CEDLAS, Facultad de Ciencias Económicas, Universidad Nacional de La Plata, CONICET and IZA, 
email: gcruces@gmail.com; gcruces@cedlas.org; 
2 
CEDLAS, Facultad de Ciencias Económicas, 
Universidad Nacional de La Plata. 
This study has been prepared within the UNU-WIDER project ‘The New Policy Model, Inequality and 
Poverty in Latin America: Evidence from the Last Decade and Prospects for the Future’, directed by 
Giovanni Andrea Cornia. 
UNU-WIDER acknowledges the financial contributions to the research programme by the governments 
of Denmark (Ministry of Foreign Affairs), Finland (Ministry for Foreign Affairs), Sweden (Swedish 
International Development Cooperation Agency—Sida) and the United Kingdom (Department for 
International Development). 
ISSN 1798-7237 ISBN 978-92-9230-_ _ _-_  
Working Paper No. 2011/x 
 
Inequality in Education 
 
Evidence for Latin America 
 
Guillermo Cruces1, Carolina García 
Domench2, and Leonardo Gasparini2 
 
December 2011 
 
Abstract 
This paper provides original empirical evidence on the evolution of education inequality 
for the Latin American countries over the decades of 1990 and 2000. The analysis 
covers a wide range of issues on the differences in educational outcomes and 
opportunities across the population, including inequality in years of education, gaps in 
school enrolment, wage skill differentials and public social expenditure. The evidence 
indicates a significant difference between the 1990s and the 2000s in terms of both the 
assessment of the equity of the education expansion and its impact on the income 
distribution. In particular, changes in the 2000s seem to have had a full equalizing 
impact on earnings, given the more pro-poor pattern of the education upgrading and a 
more stable or even increasing relative demand for low skill labour. 
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1 Introduction 
Formal education is certainly one of the main determinants of an individual’s income 
and arguably the main key to the access to a wide set of economic and social 
opportunities. Therefore, understanding the distribution of welfare in a population 
requires an assessment of the distribution of educational outcomes and their changes 
over time. This assessment is particularly relevant for Latin America, a region with high 
levels of income inequality, and wide gaps in educational achievements and 
opportunities across socioeconomic groups. The issue is particularly relevant for the 
region since the distribution of incomes and education levels has changed substantially 
over the last decades. After two decades of distributional setbacks––the 1980s with 
macroeconomic crises, and the 1990s with market-oriented reforms––income inequality 
started to fall consistently in the 2000s in almost all Latin American countries 
(Gasparini, Cruces and Tornarolli 2011). At the same time, these decades witnessed a 
substantial expansion in education. Although the expansion was widespread across 
countries, attainment levels and socioeconomic groups, changes were not uniform, 
raising the issue of measuring the pattern in education inequality and its differential 
impact on income distribution.  
In this paper we document the main features and patterns of education inequality in 
Latin America, highlighting its links with income distribution. In fact, ‘education 
inequality’ is the shortform for a wide range of issues with regard to differences in 
educational outcomes and opportunities across populations. The concept encompasses 
the analysis of inequality in years of education, gaps in school enrolment, wage skill 
differential and labour demand factors, public social expenditure, school segregation 
and other related topics. This paper tackles most of these important issues, providing 
original empirical evidence for Latin American countries.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we provide empirical evidence 
on inequality in the years of education among the working-age population. As one of 
the main productive assets for households, the level and distribution of human capital 
provides important insights on the patterns of income inequality. In section 3 we explore 
this relationship by means of multivariate regressions and microsimulation analysis that 
allow us to estimate the potential impact of the observed changes in the distribution of 
education on the earnings distribution, assuming no changes in the returns to education. 
Section 3 also discusses the potential impact of the education expansion in Latin 
American on the labour market, and in particular on wage gaps between workers 
classified by skill levels. Section 4 shifts the focus from the working-age population to 
children and youths, providing evidence on the differences in schooling rates by income 
strata for all educational levels. Gaps in school enrolment and completion rates provide 
valuable information on future income distribution, and are closely related to the 
concept of equality of opportunity. Section 5 explores the role played by three factors 
(economic growth, social spending and demography) in the increase of schooling 
opportunities. We find that the positive educational scenario of the 2000s was due to a 
combination of stronger economic growth, increased salience of social issues in the 
public arena, and a favourable phase of the region’s demographic transition. We 
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conclude in section 6 with a summary of the results and a discussion of their 
implications.1
 
 
2 Inequality in education 
In this section we briefly discuss the issue of measuring education inequality. We 
present a large set of indicators for the Latin American countries, documenting changes 
in these indicators over the last two decades, and we provide a long-term view since the 
1940s for the region as a whole.  
Our main source of information is the Socioeconomic Database for Latin America and 
the Caribbean (SEDLAC), jointly developed by CEDLAS at the Universidad Nacional 
de La Plata (Argentina) and the World Bank’s LAC poverty group (LCSPP). This 
database contains information on more than 200 official household surveys in 25 LAC 
countries. All variables in SEDLAC are constructed using consistent criteria across 
countries and years, subject to the constraint of the survey questionnaires, and identical 
programming routines (see sedlac.econo.unlp.edu.ar).  
2.1 Measuring inequality in education 
Measuring inequality in education outcomes is not a trivial task. At least two 
methodological issues must be dealt with before the estimation exercise: the choice of 
the education variable to be considered in the analysis, and the indicators used to 
measure inequality. Regarding the first issue, we follow most of the literature and focus 
on years of education of the working-age population. The choice is less clear for the 
second issue, as reflected in the multitude of inequality indicators used in the literature. 
The first conceptual issue is whether or not to make the inequality measurement 
conditional on a welfare indicator, like household income. Are we concerned, for 
instance, with the educational gap between the income of the rich and the poor, or 
between the most and least educated? By conditioning on income we assume a concern 
for the association between education and income rather than for disparities in 
educational levels per se.  
The second issue has to do with the nature––relative or absolute––of the comparisons. 
The usual assumption of scale invariance in the measurement of income inequality is 
not obviously translated into the estimations of inequality in non-monetary variables, 
like education.2 Suppose that in a certain period of time there is an increase of three 
years of education for all the relevant population: is this change inequality increasing, 
neutral or inequality increasing? Relative inequality measures––the ones used when 
analysing income distribution––assess this change as inequality-reducing, since the 
increase in years of education is proportionally more relevant for the least educated. 
Absolute inequality measures, on the other hand, evaluate the change that results from 
identical additions of years of education to all individuals as neutral for the level of 
inequality in the distribution of education. 
                                                
1  The extended working paper version of this paper (Cruces, Gasparini and García Domench 2011) also 
includes a section on educational mobility and segregation of schools attended by different 
socioeconomic strata. 
2  See Cowell (2000) and Lambert (2001) for discussions on axioms behind the measurement of 
inequality.  
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Table 1 presents six alternative measures of education inequality for one specific 
country: Uruguay, 1992-2009. The first three indicators are unconditional, while the rest 
are conditional on income. In the first group we include two measures of absolute 
inequality (the education quintile gap and the adjusted Gini coefficient) and one 
measure of relative inequality (the traditional Gini coefficient). In the group of 
conditional measures we include the educational gap between income quintiles, the 
dissimilarity index and the concentration index.3  
It is interesting to notice how the assessment of the changes in education inequality 
varies as we use different indicators. The unconditional measures indicate a fall in 
inequality, a small drop in the absolute measures (gap and adjusted Gini) and a more 
significant one in the relative measure (traditional Gini). Instead, the conditional 
measures unveil an increase in education inequality. In particular, the gap in years of 
education between the bottom and top income quintiles widened substantially over the 
period under analysis.  
These different conclusions illustrate the relevance of methodological choices regarding 
inequality indicators for assessing the evolution in education inequality. Keeping these 
issues in mind, the rest of this section focuses the analysis on two indicators: the Gini 
coefficient for the distribution of years of education and the gap in years between 
quintiles 1 and 5 of the income distribution. These two measures illustrate well the 
variety of possible results, are widely used in the literature, and are relatively easy to 
communicate when compared to other alternative indicators. 
Table 1 
Alternative education inequality indicators 
Years of education, adults 25-65 years 
 
Unconditional 
 
Conditional 
 
Gap Adjusted Gini Gini 
 
Gap Dissimilarity Concentration 
1992 11.4 2.3 0.274  
4.5 0.080 10.9 
1998 11.0 2.3 0.248  
5.3 0.090 12.1 
2004 11.1 2.3 0.236  
6.2 0.099 13.2 
2009 10.9 2.2 0.232  
6.4 0.103 14.0 
        
Change 92-09 -4% -2% -15%  
42% 29% 28% 
Source: Own calculations based on microdata from household surveys. 
2.2  Inequality in years of education: the 1990s and 2000s  
We start by documenting the average years of education in the Latin American 
countries with information obtained from the last national household survey available 
for each nation. Table 2 presents this information for all adults aged 25-65 (i.e., those 
deemed to have completed their education). The region presents some heterogeneity in 
the distribution of this indicator: only a minority of the countries have an average of 
more than nine years of education for adults in the 25-65 age range, including those in 
the Southern Cone (Argentina, Chile, Uruguay) and Panama, while some countries in 
Central America (Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua) have an average below six. 
                                                
3 The set of potential indicators includes the standard deviation, the Kolm index and others. See 
Gasparini, Cicowiez and Sosa Escudero (2011) for illustrations for Latin America.  
  
Table 2 
Years of education by gender and income quintile and inequality in education  
Adults aged 25 to 65 
     By gender  By income quintile  Inequality 
Country Year 
 
All 
 
Females Males 
 
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 
 
Gap Gini 
Argentina 2009   11.0   11.2 10.8   8.4 9.4 10.3 11.5 13.6   5.2 0.205 
Bolivia 2005   7.7   6.8 8.8   3.6 5.7 7.1 8.5 11.7   8.1 0.399 
Brazil 2009   7.7   8.0 7.6   4.9 5.9 6.8 8.2 11.2   6.3 0.349 
Chile 2009   11.0   10.9 11.1   8.9 9.6 10.2 11.3 13.7   4.8 0.195 
Colombia 
2006   7.9   7.9 7.9   5.3 5.5 6.6 8.1 12.0   6.7 0.357 
Costa Rica  2009   8.7   8.8 8.6   5.8 6.7 7.3 9.0 12.7   7.0 0.283 
Dominican Rep.  2007   8.2   8.4 8.1   5.9 6.5 7.5 8.6 11.3   5.5 0.348 
Ecuador 2009   8.7   8.7 9.0   6.3 6.8 7.7 9.0 12.2   5.9 0.323 
El Salvador 2008   7.1   6.7 7.6   3.5 5.0 6.1 7.5 11.3   7.8 0.418 
Guatemala 2006   4.8   4.3 5.4   1.4 2.3 3.4 5.1 9.0   7.7 0.560 
Honduras 2009   5.9   5.9 5.7   3.4 3.6 4.7 6.3 9.6   6.2 0.425 
Mexico 2008   8.4   8.1 8.7   5.3 6.7 7.5 8.9 12.0   6.8 0.324 
Nicaragua 2005   5.8   5.8 5.8   2.7 3.8 5.0 6.2 9.4   6.8 0.473 
Panama 2009   9.9   10.1 9.7   5.8 7.8 9.3 10.6 13.7   7.9 0.270 
Paraguay 2009   8.3   8.1 8.4   5.3 6.1 7.7 9.1 11.4   6.1 0.317 
Peru 2009   8.9   8.2 9.5   4.9 6.8 8.5 10.0 12.2   7.3 0.330 
Uruguay 2009   9.4   9.7 9.1   6.7 7.5 8.6 10.1 13.0   6.3 0.237 
Venezuela 2006   8.9   9.3 8.6   6.8 7.3 8.1 9.3 11.6   4.9 0.284 
Source:  Own calculations based on SEDLAC (CEDLAS and World Bank).  
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The third panel in Table 2 indicates that the average difference in years of education for 
adults in the top quintile compared to those in the bottom quintile is very large, at 
around 6.5 years. The Gini for years of education varies over a wide range: it is about 
0.40 or higher for Bolivia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua, and below 
0.25 for Southern Cone countries.  
Now let us turn to changes over time. Figure 1 illustrates the significant increase in the 
average years of education in the Latin American countries during the last two decades, 
continuing a process initiated decades ago.4 
Figure 1 
Change in years of education 
Adult aged 25-65 
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Note: Notice that bars are not strictly comparable since they represent different time spans. 
Source:  Own calculations based on SEDLAC (CEDLAS and World Bank).  
Education levels in all countries increased along the income distribution. Individuals 
from the poor and rich socioeconomic strata are now more educated than individuals in 
the same groups some decades ago. In this paper, however, we are more concerned 
about the differences in educational achievements than the trends for the mean. Figure 2 
shows changes for each country in the two selected educational inequality indicators 
discussed above: the gap between the bottom and top income quintile and the Gini 
coefficient for the distribution of years of education.  
The assessment of the pattern in education inequality is not robust to the choice of 
indicator. While the Gini for years of education has fallen for all the countries 
considered, the gap between quintiles has increased or remained virtually unchanged for 
most countries in the sample. Only in Chile, Peru and Venezuela has the gap shrunk 
more than 0.5 years. Changes in the quintile gaps and the Gini are loosely correlated: 
the Pearson linear correlation coefficient is just 0.09.  
In our companion paper we carry out an analysis of the changes in education inequality 
at the country level. Again, as education expands the Gini tends to go down. Changes in 
the gap are more erratic. However, a closer inspection unveils an interesting fact. In 
                                                
4 The average number of years of education for the adult population is a ‘sticky’ indicator since the 
formal education accumulation process typically stops when people are in their twenties.  
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most countries the gap increases in the 1990s, and falls in the 2000s. Table 3 
summarizes this finding. Education expanded and the Gini fell at almost the same rate 
in the two decades. However, the quintile gap widened in all countries in the 1990s 
(except for Venezuela) and shortened in most countries in the 2000s. 
The reasons behind the differences in the changes in the education distribution between 
decades may lie partly in the intensified efforts by governments in the 2000s to extend 
education to the poor, but naturally may also reflect the efforts of previous decades that 
materialized in the 2000s. We return to this topic in sections 4 and 5.  
Figure 2 
Change in education inequality  
Gini of years of education and years gap between Q5 and Q1 
Adults aged 25-65 
Change in educational gap 
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Change in educational Gini 
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Source: Own calculations based on SEDLAC (CEDLAS and World Bank).  
  
Table 2 
Changes in average years of education and in education inequality measures  
Adults aged 25-65 
 
Average years of education 
 
Gap in years Q5-Q1 
 
Gini 
 
1990s 2000s All 
 
1990s 2000s All 
 
1990s 2000s All 
Argentina 0.4 0.8 1.2   1.2 -0.6 0.7   -0.003 -0.023 -0.026 
Bolivia 0.4 0.1 0.5   0.4 -0.3 0.1   -0.067 -0.018 -0.085 
Brazil 0.9 1.7 2.5   0.8 -0.8 0.0   -0.049 -0.078 -0.127 
Chile 1.1 0.9 2.0   0.4 -1.0 -0.6   -0.044 -0.047 -0.090 
Colombia 0.7 0.4 1.0   0.3 0.0 0.3   -0.022 -0.013 -0.035 
Costa Rica  0.5 1.3 1.8   0.2 1.1 1.4   -0.031 -0.032 -0.063 
Ecuador 0.8 1.2 2.0   0.8 -0.6 0.3   -0.030 -0.032 -0.061 
El Salvador 1.5 1.0 2.4   1.2 0.1 1.3   -0.097 -0.058 -0.154 
Honduras 0.6 0.7 1.3   0.1 0.2 0.4   -0.045 -0.053 -0.098 
Mexico 1.6 0.7 2.3   1.5 -1.6 -0.2   -0.074 -0.047 -0.121 
Nicaragua 0.5 0.6 1.1   0.1 1.4 1.5   -0.035 -0.021 -0.056 
Panama 0.8 0.8 1.6   0.2 0.3 0.5   -0.032 -0.023 -0.055 
Paraguay 0.5 1.5 1.9   0.6 0.0 0.6   0.008 -0.031 -0.024 
Peru 0.1 1.0 1.0   0.0 -0.8 -0.8   0.000 -0.050 -0.050 
Uruguay 1.1 0.5 1.6   0.6 1.1 1.6   -0.044 -0.012 -0.055 
Venezuela 1.1 0.7 1.8   -0.4 -0.3 -0.8   -0.048 -0.025 -0.073 
            
Average 0.8 0.9 1.6 
 
0.5 -0.1 0.4 
 
-0.038 -0.035 -0.073 
Source:  Own calculations based on SEDLAC (CEDLAS and World Bank). 
 
7
 
 8 
2.3 Inequality in years of education: a long-term perspective  
By computing the years of education by age group in a given survey we can get an 
assessment of changes in the extension of education from a longer-term perspective. In 
our companion paper we analyse years of education by age group and income quintile. 
Educational attainment has been increasing in cohort after cohort in all Latin American 
countries, indicating a secular growth in the stock of human capital, even among the 
poorest.  
In some countries, the gap between the rich and the poor in years of education has 
remained rather constant across age groups (Argentina, Uruguay, Venezuela), as a 
consequence of a parallel increase in the years of education across socioeconomic strata 
over the century. However, for the majority of the Latin American countries the gap 
displays an inverse-U shape, implying shrinking differences in years of schooling 
between the top and bottom income quintiles for the younger cohorts. This pattern is the 
result of differences in the timing of the increase in education across quintiles: years of 
education for the top quintile increased over time first strongly but then more 
moderately, as most individuals in that strata completed secondary school. Conversely, 
the years of education for the poor population increased very slowly in the 1940s and 
1950s and started to peak in the 1970s. In some countries the gap starts to shrink for 
people in their forties (those who attended high school in the 1980s), while in some 
poorest Central American countries the gap shrinks for people in their thirties (who 
attended high school in the 1990s). In almost all countries the gap is smaller for people 
aged 25-30 than for people in their thirties or forties.  
2.4 Latin America in international perspective  
In recent years researchers have produced new evidence that allows international 
comparisons of inequality in education (e.g., Barro and Lee 2001, 2010). According to 
 
Figure 3 
Gini of years of education 
Population aged 15 and over, 1950-2010 
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Source:  Wail, Said and Abdelhak (2011) based on Barro-Lee data (2010). 
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this evidence Latin America is a region with levels close to the world average, higher 
than in the developed countries, Eastern Europe and Central Asia, but lower than in the 
rest of the developing world. Figure 3 reveals a notorious decline in the level of 
education inequality as measured by the Gini of years of formal education in all regions 
of the world. The fall has been particularly sharp in East Asia and the Pacific. In fact, 
based on the estimations of Wail, Said and Abdelhak (2011) with the Barro and Lee 
(2010) data, while the educational Gini in that region was 14 points higher than in Latin 
America in 1950, it is now four points lower. According to these estimations the fall in 
Latin America was dramatic (from 0.62 to 0.31 in just half a century) but no different 
from the fall in the world mean.  
3 Education and income inequality 
There is vast evidence of the strong positive link between education and earnings at the 
individual level. At a more aggregate level the relationship between the distribution of 
these two variables has proved harder to analyse. In this section we provide evidence for 
Latin America following three alternative approaches.  
3.1 The correlation between income and education inequality:  
A cross-country regression analysis 
The literature that explores the relationship between income and education inequality in 
a regression framework has been growing in the last decade. Checchi (2004), for 
instance, assembles an unbalanced panel of 454 observations in 94 countries and runs 
fixed-effects models. The author finds that the relationship between the Gini for 
education achievement and the income Gini is rather unstable, being U-shaped and non-
U-shaped depending on the specification. Cornia (2010) runs a model of the Gini 
coefficient for the distribution of income per capita including the Gini index for the 
distribution of years of education for the adult population as one of several explanatory 
variables. The regression is estimated over a panel of 18 Latin American countries over 
the period 1990-2007 by fixed-effects methods to control for specific country effects 
due to geography, institutions and unobservables.5 The author finds that after 
controlling for other factors, the correlation between the income and educational Ginis 
vanishes. In fact, the coefficient of the educational Gini is negative but statistically non-
significant.  
In what follows we use SEDLAC data to explore this issue. We start by exploring 
simple correlations. On average, countries with higher inequality in the distribution of 
education are those with higher income inequality. However, the association is rather 
loose. When using the last available household survey for each Latin American country 
(2009 for most countries), the linear correlation coefficient between the Gini coefficient 
for the earnings distribution and the educational gap is 0.455, while it drops to 0.340 
when taking the educational Gini. Both coefficients increase to 0.634 and 0.503, 
respectively, when dropping Chile, the main outlier for this relationship in the sample, a 
                                                
5  Cornia (2010) also presents random effects estimates, but the results are quite similar to those 
estimated by fixed effect.  
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country with high measured income inequality and relatively low education inequality.6 
When taking the correlations between changes into account, there is still a positive 
relationship between changes in education inequality and income inequality, although 
weaker than in levels. The linear correlation coefficients are 0.344 for the gap and 0.304 
for the Gini. On average countries that experienced a greater reduction in the dispersion 
of years of education also benefited from a larger reduction in income inequality. 
However, the association is weak, suggesting the presence of many other factors 
affecting both variables in different directions. 
To analyse this relationship further we run a fixed-effects model of income inequality 
on alternative measures of inequality in education with Latin American microdata. In 
particular, we take advantage of the panel assembled in Alejo (2011) for all Latin 
American countries in the period 1992-2009 with observations at the subnational level. 
We work with two panels: the short one includes six biannual observations for regions 
in 10 countries (Argentina, Brazil, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Honduras, Mexico, 
Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela) in the period 1995-2006. The long panel 
includes 17 annual observations in regions of five countries (Argentina, Brazil, Costa 
Rica, Honduras and Uruguay). This panel is larger in observations although 
encompasses fewer countries and is unbalanced.  
Table 4 
Coefficients of model for earnings inequality  
Dependent variable: Gini coefficient for the distribution of earnings 
 Long panel  Short panel 
  (1) (2) (3) (4)   (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Educational Gini -2.07 -1.18 
   
-1.94 -1.22 
  
 
(2.01)* (1.18) 
   
(2.52)* (1.60) 
  Educational Gini 
2
 0.049 0.035 
   
0.047 0.036 
  
 
(2.63)** (2.01)* 
   
(3.43)** (2.88)** 
  Educational gap 
  
-2.53 -2.38 
   
0.39 0.32 
   
(2.24)* (2.10)* 
   
(0.26) (0.21) 
Educational gap 
2
 
  
0.407 0.395 
   
0.100 0.101 
   
(3.52)** (3.40)** 
   
(0.83) (0.81) 
Years of education 
 
1.037 
 
-0.238 
  
1.064 
 
-0.657 
  
(2.04)* 
 
(0.69) 
  
(2.46)* 
 
(2.55)* 
1/years of education -39.7 
 
1.8 
  
-31.7 
 
28.9 
 
  (1.97)* 
 
(0.13) 
  
(2.03)* 
 
(2.80)** 
           
Observations 478 478 478 478 
 
366 366 366 366 
No. of sub- 27 27 27 27 
 
61 61 61 61 
countries/regions          
R
2
 (within) 0.06 0.03 0.13 0.13   0.13 0.13 0.10 0.10 
Notes:  Estimation was carried out with a fixed effect procedure; t-statistics in parentheses. * significant 
at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
Source: Own estimates based on data from household surveys. 
                                                
6 Cornia (2010) finds a linear correlation of 0.5 between the income and education Ginis over the period 
1990-2007.  
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Table 4 shows the results for the fixed-effects models. The dependent variable is the 
Gini for the distribution of earnings for workers aged 25 to 65. As right-hand side 
variables we alternatively include two indicators of education inequality - the Gini for 
the distribution of years of education and the gap in years between education quintiles - 
and mean years of education (either that variable or its inverse to capture non 
linearities). Mean earnings and its square are included as controls.7  
The evidence points to the existence of a conditional non-linear positive relationship 
between education and earnings inequality. Regions with higher education inequality 
are regions with larger disparities in earnings, even after controlling for some factors 
and taking fixed-effects into account. The relationship between mean years of education 
and earnings inequality looks somewhat more opaque. When controlling for the 
educational Gini, more years of education seem to be associated to higher earnings 
inequality. A proportional increase in education that will not alter the Gini implies a 
greater raise in absolute value for the more educated, a fact that compounded with 
increasing returns to scale could generate a surge in earnings inequality. The next 
section has more on this. Notice that when controlling for the educational gap, the 
relationship vanishes (or flip sign in the short panel).  
3.2 Exploring the direct impact of education on earnings inequality  
Given convexity in the returns to education, even an equalizing increase in schooling 
may generate an unequalizing change in the distribution of labour incomes. In this 
section we report the results of Battistón, García Domench and Gasparini (2011) who 
explore whether this ‘paradox of progress’ (Bourguignon, Ferreira and Lustig 2005) is 
just a theoretical possibility with little relevance in practice, or it is in fact a widespread 
phenomenon across Latin America.8 To that aim they carry out microeconometric 
decompositions that isolate the direct effect of changes in the distribution of education 
on earnings inequality.9 The methodology is applied to household survey microdata for 
most Latin American countries in the period 1990-2009 exploiting a dataset that 
contains homogeneous definitions for the education and labour variables involved in the 
analysis (SEDLAC). 
Figure 4 reports the counterfactual change in the Gini coefficient of the earnings 
distribution after altering the education structure of the population. The results indicate 
that if only individual education in the 1990s had changed over time, we would have 
observed increases in earnings inequality across all Latin American economies. This 
result is not surprising since educational changes were unequalizing in this period. 
Instead, in the 2000s educational changes were more balanced or even biased towards 
poorer groups. However, in most countries these equalizing changes in education were 
not enough to compensate the unequalizing effect of the highly convex structure of 
returns, and hence the effect on earnings inequality remained positive. However, in 
almost all countries the increase in the Gini for the distribution on earnings driven by 
educational changes was substantially lower in the 2000s than in the 1990s.  
                                                
7 Results are robust to alternative specifications.  
8  Klasen, Villalobos and Otter (2011) find evidence for the paradox in Honduras.  
9 The methodology follows closely Gasparini, Marchionni and Sosa Escudero (2005) that in turn follow 
Bourguignon, Ferreira and Lustig (2005). 
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Figure 4 
Effect of change in distribution of education on earnings inequality (Gini index) 
Results from microeconometric decomposition 
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Source:  Battistón, García Domench and Gasparini (2011).  
Figure 5 
Effect of an extra year of education on earnings inequality  
results from microeconometric decomposition 
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Source:  Battistón, García Domench and Gasparini (2011).  
To further illustrate the direct impact of increasing education on earnings inequality 
Figure 5 shows the change in the Gini coefficient for the distribution of labour incomes 
after an increase in one year of education in each country. The figure shows two 
alternatives: in the first one (translation) the years of education are increased by one for 
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the entire working population, while in the second (proportional) the years of education 
are increased proportionally, so the educational Gini does not vary. If we assume that 
returns to education remain constant, the effect of one additional year of education for 
every worker is undoubtedly unequalizing in all countries. On average the Gini in 
earnings increases by 1 point. Since the change in education is assumed to be balanced, 
this example illustrates the standing role of the convexity of the returns to education.  
3.3  Exploring wage skill gaps, supply and demand factors 10 
The counterfactual analysis of the previous section illustrates the first-order impact of 
education on the income distribution. The impact of education on earnings, however, 
also depends crucially on returns to human capital, which were held constant in the 
previous analysis. The purpose of this section is to present empirical evidence on the 
evolution of remuneration differentials by skill level over the decades of 1990 and 2000. 
The analysis is based on Tinbergen’s (1975) seminal contribution on the relationship 
between human capital accumulation, technical change and income inequality, which 
provides a framework for interpreting the role of labour supply and demand factors in 
the evolution of the earnings distribution. Tinbergen’s (1975) discussion is often 
referred to as ‘the race between education and technology’, because he postulates that 
secular technological change would favour the relative demand for skilled labour, thus 
increasing the skill premium (and thus inequality), whereas educational upgrading 
would provide a counterbalancing force reducing this premium. 
Following Goldin and Katz’s (2008) study of the United States in the twentieth century, 
it is possible to simplify the analysis by assuming only two levels of skills among 
workers (high and low), which facilitates the interpretation of the underlying patterns in 
terms of the evolution of the relative supply of high-skill to low-skill workers, and the 
corresponding relative wage––the skill wage premium.  
Evidence on increasing levels of education for Argentina, Brazil, Mexico and Peru is 
presented in Lustig and López Calva (2009). Although the authors do not develop a full 
analysis of the relationship between education upgrading and the wage skill premium, 
they interpret their partial evidence as consistent with a Tinbergerian setting with 
prevalence of supply factors which reduce aggregate inequality. Manacorda, Sánchez-
Páramo and Schady (2010), on the other hand, develop a full analysis of the relationship 
between changes in the wage skill premium and in the relative supply of skilled workers 
for Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, and Mexico in the 1980s and the 1990s, and 
find an increase in the supply of skilled workers and a simultaneous rise in the relative 
wages of skilled workers, which they attribute to a ‘generalized shift in the demand for 
workers with tertiary education’. 
The evidence presented in this section originates in Gasparini et al. (2011), who carry 
out a Goldin and Katz (2008) type of analysis for 16 countries in the region from the 
early 1980s to 2010 (although most of their observations correspond to the period 1990-
2009). The analysis requires the construction of country and time consistent aggregate 
measures of labour supply and wages by skill level. The document contains a detailed 
analysis of each country’s specific evolution over time, as well as decompositions of the 
                                                
10  The material and text in this section are based on Gasparini et al. (2011). 
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skill intensity of employment by sector and a further disaggregation accounting for three 
skill levels.11  
Figure 6 sums up the main findings from the analysis at the regional level. The figure 
depicts the skilled-unskilled wage premium plotted against the relative supply of skilled 
to unskilled labour for the sixteen countries in the sample during the period 1989-2009. 
Both series, which are constructed as specific indices for each country, are presented net 
of country and year-fixed effects. Consistent with the Tinbergen hypothesis, there is a 
clear negative relationship between the relative supply of skilled labour and its relative 
remuneration over the 1989-2009 period in Latin America. 
The evidence summarized in Figure 6 does not distinguish the evolution of the 
underlying variables over time. This is presented in Figure 7, which depicts the skilled-
unskilled wage premium and the relative supply of skilled to unskilled labour for the 
same sixteen Latin American countries over the period 1989-2009. Both series are 
plotted net-of-country effects (averages), but allowing for time variation.  
The results from Figure 7 complement those of Figure 6. The first remarkable fact is the 
constant and strong increase in the relative supply of skilled labour over the whole 
period under analysis. This is a relative measure of supply, and this evidence combined 
 
Figure 6 
Skilled-unskilled wage premium and relative supply, net of country and year fixed effects.  
Sixteen LA countries, 1989-2009 
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Source:  Gasparini et al. (2011), calculations based on SEDLAC (CEDLAS and World Bank).  
                                                
11 The empirical evidence presented here is based only on the skilled-unskilled differential, where skilled 
workers are those with some tertiary education and all the rest are considered unskilled. Gasparini et 
al. (2011) also analyse evidence based on the distinction between three levels of skills, with semi-
skilled workers defined as those with a secondary degree. 
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Figure 7 
Skilled-unskilled wage premium and relative supply over time, net of country effects. Sixteen LA countries, 
1989-2009 
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Source:  Gasparini et al. (2011), calculations based on SEDLAC (CEDLAS and World Bank).  
 
with the increase in years of education for all countries in the region (documented in 
section 2) indicates an educational upgrading of the labour force. The wage skill 
premium, on the other hand, exhibits a modest quadratic trend, consistent with the 
previously documented increase in earnings inequality in the 1990s and its subsequent 
fall in the 2000s. Moreover, Gasparini et al. (2011) also report a strong positive 
correlation between this skill wage premium and the Gini coefficient of the distribution 
of household per capita income––in fact, the two variables follow the same pattern for 
the decades of 1990 (increasing) and 2000 (decreasing) in terms of regional averages. 
Taken together, the figures indicate that a secular increase in the relative supply of 
skilled labour, ceteris paribus, was a factor behind the reduction in the wage skill 
premiums in Latin America over the 1990s and the 2000s.  
As stated previously, there is a constant increase in the relative supply of skilled labour 
over this period, while the wage skill premium first has an increasing trend and then a 
decreasing tendency, resulting in a relatively flat tendency over the 1990s decade. This 
relatively constant wage skill premium, combined with a strong increase in the relative 
supply of skilled labour, can be interpreted in a Tinbergen framework as denoting the 
presence of a strong demand shift towards skilled labour, which neutralizes the 
equalizing effect expected from the increase in relative supply. This interpretation is 
consistent with some country-specific studies which highlight the importance of 
privatization, trade openness and other structural reforms during the 1990s in facilitating 
skill biased technical change and, more generally, spurring the demand for skilled 
labour (see, for instance, the account of the Argentine case in Gasparini and Cruces 
2009). For the years 2000-09 there is a marked downward tendency in the wage skill 
premium. In terms of the Tinbergen model, such reductions in the wage premium 
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accompanied with an increase in the relative supply of skilled labour indicate the 
presence of weaker shifts in the relative demand for skilled labour with respect to those 
implied by trends in the previous decade. Further analysis carried out by Gasparini et al. 
(2011) indicates that some of this shift in the relative demand for unskilled labour is 
related to the increase in commodity prices and in the terms of trade of the first decade 
of 2000. 
These results highlighted the importance of skills in the market for the evolution of key 
socioeconomic indicators such as income inequality. The following section studies 
school enrolment among children and youths, which determines the future skill 
composition of the labour force. 
4 School enrolment  
While the previous pages concentrate on the educational attainment of the adult 
population, in this section we report the level and distribution of enrolment rates.
12
, 13 
Enrolment rates at all levels for all countries have increased (Figure 8). For primary 
education, the quintile gap has remained almost constant or fallen for all countries. 
There is a clear relationship between higher enrolment and smaller gaps, since the top 
quintile has historically been close to the 100 per cent ceiling––any improvement would 
narrow the gap. Notably, a set of countries have achieved increases of more than 10 
percentage points in net primary enrolment rates in relatively short periods of time. The 
increase was low for those countries that were already close to universal coverage at the 
time of the first available survey. 
While net enrolment rates also increased substantially for secondary schooling (by 20 
percentage points or more in several countries), the quintile gap has increased in some 
cases, including Nicaragua, Guatemala, El Salvador and Honduras. Finally, the 
increases in tertiary enrolment have been accompanied by rising quintile gaps in all 
countries, which implies that the increase has happened mostly at the upper level of the 
income distribution. 
When examining changes by decade, an interesting fact emerges (Table 5). Although 
the average speed of educational upgrading did not increase in the 2000s, the pattern of 
that process was substantially different both in secondary and tertiary schooling. 
Compared to the previous decade, the growth in school enrolment rates for the poor was 
considerably higher in these educational levels. In contrast, changes in primary 
schooling were not very different between decades. As most countries in the region 
approached universal enrolment the expansion in the access to primary education 
slowed down in the 2000s, and the educational gap between income quintiles slowly 
narrowed down at almost the same rate as in the 1990s. The story has been dramatically 
different for the secondary level of education. On average, the increase in enrolment 
 
                                                
12 The net enrolment rate is defined as the share of individuals in a given age group that attend the 
educational level corresponding to their age. 
13 The longer version of this paper includes a section on education quality with evidence taken from 
other studies showing a strong positive relationship between educational quality and achievements, 
and socioeconomic status.  
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Figure 8 
Change in net enrolment rates and in Q5-Q1 gap in enrolment rates 
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Source:  Own calculations based on SEDLAC (CEDLAS and World Bank).  
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was similar in both decades but while the educational gap in the 1990s widened in most 
countries, the first decade of the 2000s witnessed on average a widespread pattern of 
shrinking gaps. On average, for the sample of countries with consistent observations in 
the early 1990s and during the first decade of the millennium, the gap between the fifth 
and first quintiles in secondary school enrolment widened 2.6 points in the 1990s and 
shrunk eight points in the 2000s. The gap was reduced in all countries except El 
Salvador, Nicaragua and Uruguay. Active educational policies and the inception of 
massive cash transfer programmes conditional on school attendance in many countries 
surely contributed to this substantial increase in enrolment for the poor. For tertiary 
education the difference between the decades is also striking. While the LA average gap 
increased almost 14 points in the 1990s, it rose only 3.3 points in the 2000s. In some 
countries that gap has even shrunk during the last years.  
Table 5 
Change in net enrolment rates and gap Q5-Q1 by decades 
 Change in enrolment  Change in gap Q5-Q1 
 1990s 2000s All  1990s 2000s All 
   Secondary    
Argentina 16.9 8.3 25.2   -4.6 -12.7 -17.4 
Bolivia 9.0 8.8 17.9   18.5 -17.4 1.1 
Brazil 16.3 21.2 37.5   16.5 -14.3 2.2 
Chile 10.9 7.4 18.2   -3.8 -14.0 -17.9 
Costa Rica  7.6 23.6 31.2   2.0 -8.0 -6.0 
El Salvador 9.0 9.7 18.6   9.4 3.3 12.7 
Honduras 12.4 7.7 20.1   13.3 -5.6 7.7 
Mexico 15.3 6.8 22.1   -13.2 -17.0 -30.1 
Nicaragua 12.4 3.2 15.5   3.1 14.6 17.7 
Panama 4.8 9.9 14.6   -2.4 -20.5 -22.9 
Uruguay 6.5 1.1 7.6   -7.3 2.0 -5.3 
Venezuela 1.5 10.4 12.0   0.3 -6.6 -6.3 
        
Average 10.2 9.8 20.1   2.6 -8.0 -5.4 
         Change in enrolment  Change in gap Q5-Q1 
 1990s 2000s All  1990s 2000s All 
   Tertiary    
Argentina 4.7 5.7 10.4   21.5 1.5 23.0 
Bolivia 2.1 2.7 4.9   9.3 11.0 20.3 
Brazil 3.5 7.2 10.7   15.5 11.3 26.9 
Chile 9.9 3.3 13.2   14.8 -10.8 3.9 
Costa Rica  2.2 7.0 9.2   6.1 19.4 25.4 
El Salvador 5.7 0.8 6.5   15.1 2.7 17.8 
Honduras 2.8 1.2 4.0   14.8 3.3 18.1 
Mexico 6.4 4.2 10.6   10.7 -7.4 3.3 
Nicaragua 6.4 -0.3 6.1   18.1 -0.1 18.1 
Panama 4.1 2.0 6.1   7.9 -1.6 6.2 
Uruguay 7.3 2.0 9.4   23.4 6.5 30.0 
Venezuela 4.5 9.0 13.5   9.3 3.3 12.6 
        
Average 5.0 3.7 8.7   13.9 3.3 17.1 
Source:  Own calculations based on SEDLAC (CEDLAS and World Bank).  
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5 Spending, growth and demographics  
Latin American countries have committed increasing resources to support education, 
with the aim of expanding access and fostering quality. This higher fiscal and private 
effort has been the consequence of deliberate action to give priority to education, but 
also was possible due to a favourable economic and demographic scenario. In this 
section we take a preliminary view of this issue.  
In what follows we concentrate on public spending since the government is by large the 
main actor in the education sector, but also because consistent information on private 
spending in education is not readily available. In any case, the evidence suggests a 
sizeable increase in the relevance of the private sector, both in absolute and relative 
terms, which adds to the increase in public spending that we document in this section.  
Table 6 
Public spending in education per child aged 0-14 (in USD PPP) 
  1990 1995 2000 2010 
Argentina  657 1128 1678 3052 
Bolivia 
 
377 456 807 
Brazil  514 1016 1216 2394 
Chile  370 685 1334 2749 
Colombia  264 445 536 877 
Costa Rica  475 706 1146 2520 
Dominican R.  68 172 399 648 
Ecuador  276 325 289 666 
El Salvador  137 220 478 741 
Guatemala  115 147 246 354 
Honduras 218 226 434 873 
Mexico  489 880 1257 2068 
Nicaragua  90 113 192 425 
Panama 397 544 874 1649 
Paraguay  93 311 376 575 
Peru 135 332 416 801 
Uruguay  508 693 995 2604 
Venezuela 645 886 1291 2312 
     
Average * 320 511 756 1451 
Note:  The table assumes constant share of spending in education from 2006 to 2010.  
 * To compute the LA average we estimate missing observations using information from close 
years.  
Source:  Own calculation based on information from CEPAL (share of public spending in education, and 
population) and World Bank (GDP). 
In Table 6 we compute a measure of the potential of public investment in education to 
increase access and quality. Specifically, the table shows public spending in education 
for each country/year in USD PPP for children under 14.14 There is a sustained increase 
in all countries in the public funds available for education per child. The average for 
Latin America steadily increased from USD 320 in 1990, to 511 in 1995, 756 in 2000 
and 1451 in 2010: this figure has become fourfold in just 20 years. The increase in the 
                                                
14 Spending includes all educational levels. We restrict the youth population at 14 due to data 
availability. 
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2000s was roughly the same as in the 1990s in proportional terms, but much larger in 
absolute terms.  
A simple decomposition can be useful to characterize this increase. We write public 
spending in education per child gN=G/N as the product of three terms: the share of 
spending in education in GDP (G/Y), per capita GDP (Y/P) and the inverse of the share 
of children in the population (P/N)
 
N
P
P
Y
Y
G
g N ..
  
(1) 
 
Of course, this decomposition is exact by definition, but illustrates the forces that can 
allow a change in public spending per child gN: changes in social policy that modify the 
share of public spending for education in GDP, economic growth that affects per capita 
GDP, and demographic changes that alter the share of children in the population.  
Table 7 shows public spending in education as a share of GDP in all Latin American 
countries. The dispersion across countries is remarkable: while the share was 2.3 in 
Dominican Republic it was 7.6 in Honduras.15 However, it should be taken into account 
that public spending figures are not easy to harmonized, and that recorded gaps between 
countries might be largely driven by differences in accounting procedures.  
Table 7 
Share of public spending in education in GDP 
 
1990 1995 2000 2010 
Argentina  3.6 4.2 5.1 5.3 
Bolivia  
5.5 5.8 6.3 
Brazil  3.4 5.1 5.0 5.6 
Chile  2.3 2.6 3.9 4.1 
Colombia  2.4 3.0 3.3 3.0 
Costa Rica  3.9 4.2 5.1 5.9 
Dominican R.  0.9 1.6 2.5 2.3 
Ecuador  2.8 2.6 2.1 2.6 
El Salvador  1.9 2.0 3.4 3.1 
Guatemala  1.8 1.9 2.9 3.0 
Honduras 4.3 3.7 6.2 7.6 
Mexico  2.6 3.9 3.9 4.1 
Nicaragua  2.6 2.8 3.7 5.5 
Panama  3.6 3.5 4.2 4.0 
Paraguay  1.3 3.6 4.3 4.1 
Peru  1.6 2.7 2.8 2.6 
Uruguay  2.5 2.5 3.0 4.3 
Venezuela 3.5 3.8 5.1 5.5 
     
Average * 2.8 3.3 4.0 4.4 
Note: * To compute the LA average we estimate missing observations using information from close 
years.  
Source:  Own calculation based on information from CEPAL (share of public spending in education, and 
population) and World Bank (GDP). 
                                                
15 The share reported for Cuba is 14.6. Due to data limitations we do not include this country in the 
analysis.  
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Despite the fluctuations, there is a clear pattern in all countries towards an increase in 
the fiscal effort to support public education. On average, the pace of this increase seems 
to have been constant over time. The mean share of public spending in education in total 
GDP is 2.8 in 1990, 3.3 in 1995, 4.0 in 2000 and 4.4 in 2010. From these data there is 
no discernible change in public spending in education during the 2000s, a decade 
characterized by the election of many progressive regimes, some with new approaches 
to educational policy.  
Table 8 
Share of people aged 0-14 in total population  
 
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020* 
Argentina  30.5 30.8 29.4 30.5 30.7 28.0 25.0 23.1 
Bolivia 41.4 42.7 43.0 42.6 40.9 39.6 35.8 31.1 
Brazil  41.6 43.3 42.4 38.1 35.3 29.6 25.5 20.1 
Chile  36.7 39.5 39.7 33.0 29.9 27.8 22.3 20.2 
Colombia  42.7 46.4 45.9 40.9 36.6 32.9 28.8 25.4 
Costa Rica  38.5 44.8 44.8 37.8 35.9 31.8 25.3 21.9 
Ecuador  39.5 43.4 44.4 42.8 39.0 34.5 30.6 26.1 
El Salvador  42.7 45.1 46.3 44.7 40.9 37.3 31.5 27.2 
Guatemala  44.6 45.8 44.6 45.4 45.4 44.1 41.5 37.0 
Honduras  42.3 46.1 47.7 47.0 45.5 42.4 36.8 31.8 
Mexico  42.5 45.9 46.6 44.7 38.6 33.1 27.9 23.3 
Nicaragua  42.9 47.5 48.1 47.1 46.0 40.9 34.5 30.2 
Panama  40.2 43.0 43.9 40.5 35.2 31.9 29.0 25.5 
Paraguay  47.0 47.9 46.1 42.5 41.4 38.2 33.5 29.5 
Peru  41.6 43.3 44.0 41.9 38.3 34.1 29.9 25.9 
Dominican R.  45.3 48.2 47.8 42.7 38.7 35.1 31.4 28.1 
Uruguay  27.9 27.9 27.9 26.9 26.1 24.6 22.5 20.5 
Venezuela 43.4 45.7 45.6 40.7 38.0 33.7 29.5 26.3 
Latin America 40.2 42.5 42.5 39.6 36.4 31.9 27.7 23.6 
Note:  Estimations for 2020.  
Source:  CEPAL based on census data. 
It is a well-known fact that there have been dramatic changes in the demographic 
pattern of the Latin American populations in the last fifty years. Fertility rates increased 
until the 1960s, implying a peak in the share of the young population in the national 
1970 censuses. From that point on, the region experienced a significant reduction in 
fertility rates. The fall in the ratio of children in the population has been speeding up 
over time: it was 7 per cent in the 1970s, 8 per cent in the 1980s, 12 per cent in the 
1990s, 13 per cent in the 2000s and is forecasted to be 15 per cent in the 2010s 
(Table 8). The figures are even larger for the weighted average, since the fall in fertility 
rates is larger in Brazil and Mexico. While the share of children in Latin America 
dropped 35 per cent from 1970 to 2010, the fall in both Brazil and Mexico was 40 per 
cent. With constant real resources and education costs, this demographic pattern has 
implied, and would imply, a great opportunity to increase school enrolment rates.16 
                                                
16 The situation is different for the youths: in the LA aggregate, the share in the total population has not 
changed much over the last decades. The population share of the young in the age of attendance at 
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Table 9  
Decomposition in the change of public spending in education per child aged 0-14  
  Social policy Growth Demographics Total 
Argentina 26.1 60.0 13.9 100.0 
Brazil 32.7 45.7 21.6 100.0 
Chile 29.9 54.5 15.6 100.0 
Colombia 19.0 60.4 20.5 100.0 
Costa Rica 25.5 53.0 21.5 100.0 
El Salvador 29.1 54.9 16.0 100.0 
Guatemala 45.3 46.6 8.1 100.0 
Honduras 41.0 43.4 15.6 100.0 
Mexico 31.8 45.2 23.0 100.0 
Nicaragua 47.7 33.3 19.0 100.0 
Panama 8.0 77.2 14.8 100.0 
Paraguay 60.9 26.8 12.3 100.0 
Peru 28.3 57.1 14.6 100.0 
Uruguay 34.0 56.6 9.4 100.0 
Venezuela 35.5 44.2 20.3 100.0 
     
Average 33.0 50.6 16.4 100.0 
Source:  Own calculation based on information from CEPAL (share of public spending in education, and 
population) and World Bank (GDP). 
Based on Equation (1), Table 9 reports the results of a simple decomposition that 
simulates the change in gN for each country if all but one factor had remained constant 
between 1990 and 2010. 
Three factors have contributed to the increase in spending per child. On average 
economic growth contributed approximately half of the increase while changes in social 
policy contributed roughly a third and demographics the remaining one-sixth. The 
figures illustrate the central role of economic growth in sustaining the efforts to increase 
education, and at the same time alert us to the difficulty of sustaining education 
upgrading in less favourable economic scenarios. The table also illustrates the key role 
played by policy: most countries have made substantial progress in the accumulation of 
human capital due to consistent efforts to increase fiscal funds assigned to education.  
6 Concluding remarks 
The evidence presented in this paper suggests that Latin American countries have made 
substantial process in increasing overall levels of human capital. This expansion has 
been encouraged by social policy, fuelled by economic growth and favoured by the 
region’s demographics transition. Although the size of this expansion was roughly the 
same over the last decades, the evidence suggests a significant difference between the 
                                                                                                                                          
high school, college and graduate programmes is expected to fall 5 per cent between 2010 and 2020, 
so the ‘demographic bonus’ at that level would be small or negligible. In fact, in some poor countries 
like Bolivia, El Salvador or Guatemala the share of the youth is expected to increase in the coming 
years, posing an additional challenge to the perspective of expanding superior education. 
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decades of the 1990 and 2000 in terms of both the assessment of the equity of the 
education expansion and its impact on income distribution.  
While the gap in the years of education across the income quintiles widened in the 
1990s in all Latin American countries, during the first decade of the 2000s, it shrunk as 
an overall average and individually in several countries. The reasons behind the 
differences in the changes in the education distribution between decades lie partly in the 
intensification of efforts by governments in the 2000s to extend education to the poor, 
but also in the efforts of the previous decades that materialized in the new millennium. 
The recent encouraging patterns for the indicators of inequality in years of education are 
also present in other dimensions as enrolment rates and educational mobility. Latin 
America might have reached a turning point where educational upgradings are 
becoming unambiguously equalizing. 
Increases in education did not have a visible equalizing impact on the earnings and 
income distributions in the 1990s due to at least two factors: educational upgrading was 
unbalanced, and the relative demand for unskilled labour fell during the decade due to 
several factors including some market-oriented reforms, technological changes, 
international prices, and weak labour policies. In contrast the increase in education in 
the 2000s seems to have had a full equalizing impact on earnings, given the more pro-
poor pattern of education upgrading and a more stable or even increasing relative 
demand for low-skill labour.  
There are some caveats with respect to the educational trends’ effect on future 
inequality. It might be difficult to sustain high quality schooling systems in the context 
of large increases in enrolment rates. While gaps in the quantity might be closing, it is 
possible that the gap in quality (especially between public and private schools) might be 
increasing in the region. This fact may reduce the probability of access to tertiary 
education for poor children, since they will compete with better-prepared children from 
richer households. Increasing the quality of public schools should be a priority in the 
agenda of governments interested in equalizing opportunities through education. Also, 
despite a reduction in income disparities in the 2000s, there is no evidence of a 
reduction in the degree of school segregation between public and private schools across 
children from different socioeconomic strata (Gasparini et al. 2010), a fact that raises 
some concerns over the degree of social cohesion in the near future.  
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